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Abstract
The standard of proof plays a vital role in the process of administration of 
justice. In criminal proceedings, the standard stipulates the degree to which the 
party who has the burden of proof needs to establish the facts constituting the 
elements of the crime. This article gives an overview of the meaning and scope 
of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard and subsequently argues that this 
standard is adopted in the Ethiopian legal system although it is nowhere clearly 
stated. It discusses the normative legal framework from which this standard can 
be inferred. It then explores the practice of the Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Division by summarizing and analyzing cases most pertinent to the 
issue of standard of proof.
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“Certainty, absolute certainty, is a satisfaction which on every ground of inquiry 
we are continually grasping at, but which the inexorable nature of things has 
placed forever out of reach. Practical certainty, a degree of assurance sufficient 
for practice, is a blessing, the attainment of which, as often as it lies in our way 
to attain it, may be sufficient to console us under the want of any such 
superfluous and unattainable acquisitions”. - Jeremy Bentham**
Introduction
The standard of proof, along with other basic notions in the law of evidence, 
plays a vital role in the process of administration of justice. The process of 
adjudication necessitates the settlement of facts of the case and this is to be 
ascertained through the introduction of evidence from which the court may draw 
warranted inferences. While decision-making based on facts is a common
* LL.B (AAU), The author can be reached at hmajirans@gmail.com
** Jeremy Bentham (quoted in Terence Anderson, David A. Schum, William Twining 
(2005), Analysis of Evidence 2nd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 
228.
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phenomenon in everyday life, the legal system lays down a number of rules 
governing the decision-making process so as to ensure that the system facilitates 
correct decisions at least most of the time.
The Ethiopian legal system nowhere clearly states the requisite standard of 
proof in criminal proceedings. With such a gap in the normative framework, the 
understanding of this standard is as diverse as the courts themselves resulting in 
divergent outcomes of cases. This article aims at exploring the meaning and 
scope of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt standard’ and how it found its way 
into the Ethiopian legal system. It also looks into policy instruments and draft 
documents to determine the general direction towards which the legal system is 
headed as far as the standard of proof is concerned. Giving a detailed account of 
selected decisions of the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court, the 
article provides a comprehensive account of the jurisprudence of this Court on 
the issue.
The first section discusses the meaning of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard drawing from the experience of other countries that apply the same 
standard. It also explores the effect of affirmative defenses and presumptions on 
the scope of the standard. After a look at various legislations, the second section 
then argues that ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is the standard impliedly included 
in the Ethiopian legal system. The third section provides a brief overview of 
legal presumptions in Ethiopian criminal law with a view to determine whether 
and to what extent such presumptions affect the burden and standard of proof in 
criminal proceedings. The practice of courts in Ethiopia, particularly that of the 
Federal Supreme Court, Cassation Division is discussed in the fourth section by 
analyzing selected cases that are most pertinent to the issue. It notes that the 
practice is divergent and inconsistent with the normative framework.
1. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard
This section explores the meaning of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. It 
gives an overview of the prevalent formulations of the standard under the US 
legal system and the criticisms leveled against each after which a discussion of 
affirmative defenses and presumptions follow.
1.1 Meaning
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard was developed from the realization 
that in human affairs what can be achieved at best is ‘moral certainty’- as 
opposed to ‘full certainty’ as in mathematics or logic.1 When it comes to moral 
certainty, what is required is not proof beyond all doubt, but rather establishing
1 Larry Laudan (2006), Truth, Error and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal 
Epistemology, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 32.
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the fact as firm and settled with the help of the presented evidence and 
testimony. Among the different theories and formulations surrounding the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, Larry Laudan has identified five 
formulations, discussed them as the major variations and identified the problems 
with each.2
a) Analogy with important life decisions:
According to this formulation, beyond a reasonable doubt is compared with 
important decisions one has to make in everyday life. Laudan criticizes this 
formulation by pointing out that in almost all important life decisions, people act 
despite the fact that there are reasonable doubts.3 The degree of doubt that is 
considered acceptable under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is much 
lesser than what people entertain in their private decisions no matter how 
important. Thus equating the beyond a reasonable doubt standard with making 
important life decisions is erroneous because it would amount to allowing a 
guilty verdict despite the existence of reasonable doubt.
b) Doubt that would make a prudent person hesitate to act:
instead of describing what belief beyond reasonable doubt is, this test attempts 
to explain what a ‘reasonable doubt’ is. Accordingly, a reasonable doubt is 
described as a doubt that would cause a prudent person to hesitate to act on that 
belief (as opposed to the kind of doubt despite which you would act without 
hesitation). This analogy can be criticized for the same reason as the first since 
one may hesitate to act in an important affair not only when there are reasonable 
grounds. it has also been criticized for being too vague in its formulation.4
c) An abiding conviction of guilt:
This is very similar with the historical ‘moral certainty’ formulation. The literal 
meaning of the word ‘abiding’ envisages that the fact-finder must believe in the
2 This section of the discussion is based on what is presented by Laudan who outlined 
the various definitions in his book drawing from the experience of US courts in jury 
instructions on the standard of proof and the decisions of appellate courts on the issue. 
For a detailed discussion of each of the definitions see Id, pp. 34-51.
3 Id., p. 36.
4 After citing this standard, one judge has written “I was always bemused by its 
ambiguity. If the jurors encounter a doubt that would cause them to "hesitate to act in 
a matter of importance," what are they to do then? Should they decline to convict 
because they have reached a point of hesitation, or should they simply hesitate, then 
ask themselves whether, in their own private matters, they would resolve the doubt in 
favor of action, and, if so, continue on to convict?”, See, Jon O. Newman (1993), 
“Beyond “Reasonable Doubt””, New York University Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 5, p. 
4.
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guilt and conviction of the accused and that this belief will last for a 
considerable period of time. But making such determination prospectively is 
very difficult, if not impossible. The problem with this definition is that it puts 
too much emphasis on the subjective belief of the fact-finder instead of laying 
down objective criteria such as the level of evidence required. This, in turn, may 
result in conviction being doled out without a high degree of guilt having been 
established thereby defeating the very purpose of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard.
d) Doubt for which a reason could be given:
Here the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is explained by requiring that the 
fact-finder is to find the defendant not guilty if, after considering the evidence, 
he has a lingering doubt about such guilt for which a reason can be given. By 
simply requiring ‘a reason’ (and failing to qualify the degree), this description of 
the standard has the effect of distorting what it stands for; it fails to incorporate 
the qualification of the doubt as ‘reasonable’.
e) High probability:
Under this definition, a belief beyond reasonable doubt is considered as one that 
is highly probable. It is an attempt to quantify the degree of likelihood to be 
attached to the truth of a belief. The fact-finder is to convict the defendant when 
he is convinced of the guilt of the defendant close to certainty measured by a 
numerical degree of confidence. This formulation, though advocated by some 
legal scholars,5 has been expressly rejected by various courts.6 An objection 
leveled against this definition is that it involves an explicit admission that the 
criminal justice system admits a certain number of wrongful convictions. This in 
turn, it is argued, will erode public confidence in the whole process.7
Proponents of this view thus hold that it is better for us to refrain from 
expressly admitting the possibility of wrongful convictions although it is 
impossible to set up a perfect system of criminal procedure that avoids all errors. 
Another problem with attaching mathematical probability to the standard is that 
there is no agreement as to where it is to be set. The first attempt to quantify 
beyond a reasonable doubt was made in 1970 where, after a research, it was 
concluded that the standard stood between a 0.70 and 0.74 probability. Others
5 One writer, for example, stated “.the criminal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
is akin to a probability greater than 0.90 or 0.95. Perhaps, as most courts have ruled, 
the prosecution is not allowed to quantify "reasonable doubt," but that is only an odd 
quirk of the math-phobic legal system” (Edward K. Cheng (2012), 
“Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof’, 122 Yale Law Journal (2012) Working 
Draft of June 18, 2012), p. 1.
6 See, for example, McCulloch v. State, 99 Nev. 72, (1983).
7 Id, p. 46.
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who have tried to put it in those terms have generally stated that it is much 
higher than the civil standard of 0.5 probability.8
Even if the problem of defining the standard could be overcome, there are a 
host of issues that inevitably stem from the very nature of human decision­
making. Although fact-finders may do their level-best to base their decisions 
according to the dictates of the law, there are certain extraneous factors that will 
affect their decisions.9 All these issues attest to the fact that the ultimate decision 
in a criminal case will be affected by factors external to the legal system itself. 
Properly defining the standard of proof will do little to dispel these issues 
because the standard aims at setting the final degree of certainty required of 
decision-makers while these factors will entail a variation on the starting point 
for analysis. Even if we were to succeed in our attempt to define what is meant 
by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, some lingering problems that are 
embedded in the decision-making process remain. This by no means suggests 
that such an attempt is futile; it merely points out that defining the standard is 
not a panacea to the problems. We would go a long way in the right direction if 
we manage a more precise definition of the standard of proof in a legal system 
as it will help to significantly reduce, if not do away with, the element of 
arbitrariness.
1.2 Scope of the Standard
when we say the prosecutor has the burden to prove the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it implies that each element of the crime needs to be proved 
by this high threshold. What constitutes ‘elements of the crime’ is a matter to be 
determined by the substantive criminal law. While this is the general rule, there 
are certain issues that are considered exceptions to it. The two main areas that
8 See, for example, Robert D. Bartels (1981), “Punishment and the Burden of Proof in 
Criminal Cases: a Modest Proposal”, 66 Iowa Law Review 899, p. 900.
9 See Jack B. Weinstein and Ian Dewsbury (2006), “Comment on the Meaning of ‘Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ ”, Law, Probability and Risk, (Advance Access 
publication on January 15, 2007), p. 6; They identified the following external factors 
affecting the decision of judges:
- personal experience,
- degree of confidence in the police, the prosecutor, the court and the justice 
system as a whole,
- perception of the danger of the moment,
- defendant’s past crimes or problematic life style,
- beliefs about the future dangerousness of the defendant.
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raise issues of compatibility with the principle are: presumptions, and 
affirmative defenses.10
1.2.1 Affirmative Defenses
Writing about the English law of evidence, Emson notes that ‘[A]s a general 
rule, the prosecution are obliged (i) to prove that the accused committed the 
actus reus of the offence with the requisite mens rea and (ii) to disprove any 
defense (in respect of which the accused has discharged a mere evidential 
burden).’11 The accused is required to discharge an evidential (and not legal) 
burden when it comes to affirmative defenses.12 Therefore, in addition to 
proving the elements of a crime, the prosecutor need also prove the absence or 
non-applicability of any defenses the accused may raise.
Murphy argues that ‘.such cases do not violate [the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard]. because the accused is not called upon to disprove any 
essential element of the charge; they merely provide that if he raises an 
affirmative defense or an issue of his own, he may be called upon to prove or 
adduce evidence in support of such defense or issue.”13 The House of Lords in 
2009 similarly held that provisions that put on the accused an evidential burden 
to prove affirmative defenses were compatible with the notion of presumption of 
innocence found in the European Convention on Human Rights.14
1.2.2 Presumptions
As regards the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof, Murphy notes two 
views.15 According to the first view, a presumption creates an evidential burden 
on the opponent i.e. ‘the presumed fact will be taken as proved unless the 
opponent produces some evidence to rebut the presumption.’16 If the opponent 
succeeds in doing this, the normal burden of proof comes to be applied as if the 
presumption never existed. The second view, on the other hand, holds that a 
presumption has the effect of shifting the legal burden of proof of the presumed 
fact to the opponent who will be required to disprove it to the applicable
10 See Vivian Deborah Wilson (1980), “Shifting Burdens in Criminal Law: A Burden on 
Due Process”, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 4, p. 733; Chief 
Justice M. Monir (2006), Textbook on the Law of Evidence 7th Ed., (New Delhi: 
Universal Law Publishing), p. 55.
11 Raymond Emson (2004), Evidence 2nd Ed., (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 
424.
12 Gavin Dingwall (2002), “Statutory Exceptions, Burdens of Proof and the Human 
Rights Act 1998”, Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, Issue 3, p. 451.
13 Peter Murphy (2007), Murphy on Evidence 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press), p. 82.
14 Dingwall, supra note 12, p. 451.
15 Murphy, supra note 13, p. 74.
16 Ibid.
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standard of proof. However, this distinction is relevant only to civil cases 
because in criminal cases presumptions do not have the effect of shifting the 
legal burden of proof. When a presumption is applied in a criminal case, it will 
only have the effect of shifting the evidential burden to the accused.17
Since presumptions in criminal proceedings raise issues of compatibility with 
the presumption of innocence and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, 
different jurisdictions have come up with certain criteria that must be met for a 
presumption to be found in line with these notions. The US Supreme Court, for 
example, developed several tests such as “comparative convenience” and 
“rational connection.”18 The European Court of Human Rights also stated that 
the European Convention does not prohibit the use of presumptions, but that 
they should be kept ‘within reasonable limits which take into account the 
importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defense.’19 The 
British jurisprudence on the matter, recognizing that the presumption of 
innocence is not absolute, reflects a two-stage test to check if the exceptional 
measure of shifting the evidential burden of proof to the defendant is justified: a 
clear and proper public objective and a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality.20
Despite the justifications and explanations given by courts and writers, the 
issues discussed above pose at least a theoretical problem since shifting the 
evidential burden of proof goes contrary to the requirement that the prosecution 
prove all elements of the crime by a high degree of proof. They result in an 
unequal treatment between cases in which these ‘exceptions’ come into 
operation and other ordinary cases. Let us take a murder case as an example. 
Ordinarily the prosecutor would be required to prove- beyond a reasonable 
doubt- every element of the crime of homicide against the defendant. if, on the 
other hand, the defendant is to raise self-defense as a justification, he will bear 
the evidential burden having to prove it, as some argue, on the balance of 
probabilities standard. in this latter case we are implying that a wrongful 
conviction and a wrongful acquittal are equally undesirable errors thereby 
contradicting the very purpose of the standard of proof being set high in 
criminal cases.21
17 Id., p. 75.
18 Wilson, supra note 10, p. 742.
19 Salabiaku v. France, 13 EHRR, (1988), p. 379.
20 Dingwall, supra note 12, p. 457.
21 Laudan, supra note 1, p. 113.
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2. The Standard of Proof in Criminal Proceedings in the 
Ethiopian Legal System: The Normative Framework
The standard of proof in criminal proceedings is not clearly stipulated in any 
piece of Ethiopian legislation. The absence of a codified and comprehensive law 
of evidence in Ethiopia requires us to explore the diverse substantive and 
procedural laws in order to examine a particular evidentiary notion such as the 
standard of proof. Studying this standard in criminal proceedings requires a 
discussion of the related concept of presumption of innocence of the accused.
The beyond reasonable doubt standard is a definitional element of the notion 
of ‘presumption of innocence’ of the defendant in criminal proceedings. By 
requiring that the fact-finder begins his inquiry ‘with a skeptical mindset’22, the 
presumption of innocence ensures that such presumption is rebutted if and when 
the prosecution proves the guilt of the defendant by a high standard of proof 
namely the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The presumption of innocence 
is a fundamental principle that has gained recognition in a number of countries 
with diverse legal systems.23
Since the presumption defines the starting point of the fact-finding at trial, it 
necessitates the introduction of powerful evidence to prove the contrary i.e. the 
guilt of the accused. As Chambers notes, ‘the presumption of innocence and 
reasonable doubt work in tandem to produce sound verdicts while serving 
similar, but not identical, purposes.'24 As will be subsequently argued, 
therefore, in a legal system where presumption of innocence is recognized, the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard follows as the standard of proof required of 
the prosecution to prove guilt before the court can lawfully convict the 
defendant. This section examines the laws and other instruments in the 
Ethiopian legal system relevant to the issue of standard of proof in criminal 
proceedings.
2.1 The FDRE Constitution
The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) 
recognizes the principle of presumption of innocence in no uncertain terms. It 
provides that “[d]uring proceedings accused persons have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law...” 25 There is a 
discrepancy between the Amharic and English versions of this constitutional
22 Henry L. Chambers, Jr. (1998), “Reasonable Certainty and Reasonable Doubt”, 
Marquette Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 3, p. 18.
23 Ibid.
24 Id, p. 20.
25 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 1/1995, 
(Hereinafter the FDRE Constitution). Art. 20 (3).
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provision. Roughly translated the Amharic states that accused persons have the 
right ‘not to be presumed guilty in legal proceedings’.26 This is also the 
protection accorded to the accused under the previous constitutions and is much 
narrower than the concept of presumption of innocence. Although the Amharic 
is the binding version,27 we must look into whether this discrepancy in 
terminology is an intentional measure or a mere semantic error.
The rights and freedoms found in the Third Chapter of the Constitution are to 
be interpreted in light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and the International Covenants on Human Rights and international instruments 
adopted by Ethiopia.28 The UDHR, ICCPR and several other international 
instruments recognize the right of the accused to be presumed innocent.29 
According to these international instruments and the FDRE Constitution, this 
presumption of innocence will be rebutted when the defendant is ‘proved guilty 
according to the law’, but they do not specify the standard of proof. The Human 
Rights Committee has discussed the meaning of presumption of innocence 
under General Comment 32 in which it clarified the obligation of states parties 
to the Covenant by specifying that the presumption requires the prosecution to 
prove the charge and ‘...guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the 
charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.’30 (emphasis added). The 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard can, therefore, be regarded as part of the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
26 Ibid. The Amharic version states: “[P+hfifrrt^T] n^Cfr OfrnF n+hfifrnh
fAw^mC... trn-nh
27 FDRE Constitution, Art. 106.
28 FDRE Constitution, Art.13 (2).
29 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (10 December 1948, 217 A (III)), Art. 
11 (1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 999), Art. 14 (2); African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights Art. 7(1)(b); African Charter on The Rights and Welfare 
of the Child Art. 17(2)(c)(i); European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Art. 6(2); Convention on the Rights of the Child Art. 40(2)(b)(i); Body of Principles 
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 
Principle 36(1).
30 UN Human Rights Committee (2007), General comment no. 32, Article 14, Right to 
equality before courts and tribunals and to fair trial, (23 August 2007, 
CCPR/C/GC/32), para. 30.
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2.2 The Criminal Procedure Code
Promulgated in 1961, the Criminal Procedure Code is still applicable as the 
basic procedural law regulating criminal proceedings in Ethiopia.31 It has 
predominantly adopted the adversarial system and is influenced by the Malayan 
Code of Criminal Procedure.32
The rules governing trial do not clearly stipulate the degree of proof that is 
required. There are, however, some provisions from which inferences can be 
made. After the case for the prosecution is concluded, the court is to weigh the 
presented evidence.33 Upon such evaluation, if it finds that what is presented by 
the prosecution (if unrebutted) would not suffice for a guilty verdict, then the 
court is to enter an order of acquittal without the need to call the accused to 
defend himself. If on the other hand, the prosecution’s evidence is found 
sufficient to warrant conviction, then the accused will be called to enter into his 
defense.34 Article 141 reads: “When the case for the prosecution is concluded, 
the court, if it finds that no case against the accused has been made out which, if 
unrebutted, would warrant a conviction, shall enter an order of acquittal.”35 The
31 Since the power of promulgating the procedural laws (civil or criminal) is not listed as 
a federal power in the Constitution, it is arguably within the mandate of the Regional 
States to enact their own criminal procedure laws. However, no Regional State has 
passed its own law of criminal procedure to date nor has the federal government 
enacted a law on the matter; hence the 1961 Code remains the major law that is 
operational and governs the process of criminal litigation all over the country. It is 
important to note that even if no other comprehensive law has been promulgated, 
there are pieces of legislation, both federal and regional, that provide for certain areas 
in deviation from, or in addition to the Code. See, Wondwossen Demissie Kassa 
(2012), Ethiopian Criminal Procedure: A Textbook, (Addis Ababa: American Bar 
Association), p. 22-23.
32 Stanley Z. Fisher (1969), Ethiopian Criminal Procedure, A Sourcebook (Addis 
Ababa: Haile Selassie I University), introduction, p. xii.
33 Worku Yaze explains “The court is supposed to assess the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution and foresee the probable outcome in case the accused fails to adduce 
defense and evidence. That is, in order for the court to order the accused to enter into 
his defense, the court should weigh the evidence adduced by the prosecution and, on 
the basis of the evidence, it should be convinced that it would automatically convict 
the accused in case he has no defense” Worku Yaze Wodage (2010), “Presumption of 
Innocence and the Requirement of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Reflections on 
Meaning, Scope and their Place under Ethiopian Law” in Wondwossen Demissie 
(Ed.), Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings: Normative and Practical Aspects, 
Ethiopian Human Rights Law Series, Vol. III, p. 128.
34 Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia, Proclamation 185/1961, (hereinafter Cr. Pro. 
Code), Art. 142. Cr. Pro. Code, Art. 142.
35 Cr. Pro. Code, Art. 141.
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Amharic, roughly translated, states: ‘After the public prosecutor concludes his 
case, if it is found that [the evidence] is insufficient to find the defendant guilty 
without the need to present evidence to rebut it and if the court finds the 
evidence [of the prosecution] insufficient, the court shall order the acquittal of 
the accused’ (emphasis added).36 The question then is what the Code means by 
evidence that ‘would warrant a conviction’.37
As discussed above, the Criminal Procedure Code was greatly influenced by 
the Malayan Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 141 of our Code is a verbatim 
copy of Section 180 of the Malayan Code which provides for the same 
procedure.38 It is thus safe to conclude that this provision in our Criminal 
Procedure Code was meant to carry the same meaning as its Malayan 
counterpart. In explaining the meaning of Section 180 of the Malayan Code, 
Fisher cites a case entertained by the High Court of Malaya in 1946. In this case, 
the Court reasoned that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the 
accused and ‘only evidence beyond all reasonable doubt’ is sufficient to warrant 
conviction.39 Given its close connection with this Code and the special similarity 
of this particular provision, one may argue that the Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code also had the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in view. This 
is buttressed by the fact that the Code was fashioned after the adversarial system 
of procedure in which this standard is an established norm. Therefore, there are 
strong reasons to conclude that the Criminal Procedure Code provision is to be 
understood as implying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Because of British influence in the country since 1941, such adversarial 
elements in the Ethiopian legal system were prevalent.40 Since we now have a
36 The Amharic version reads “O.^a iwu n^A
AAAA7. AW} AA-Tll za E^ nt UT
A?i7& Wl ElWi E9-W* fCfr a* ,PHA” Art. 141 Cr. Pro. Code.
37 Relying on a contrario reading of the Amharic version of this provision, some argue 
that what is implied in this provision is the ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof; 
some court decisions also reflect this standard.
38 Sec. 180 of the Malayan Code of Criminal Procedure reads: “When the case for the 
prosecution is concluded, the Court, if it finds that no case against the accused has 
been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, shall record an 
order of acquittal, or if it does not so find, shall call on the accused to enter on his 
defense.” in Fisher, supra note 32, p. 311.
39 Ibid.
40 Simeneh Kiros Assefa (2012), “The Principle of the Presumption of Innocence and its 
Challenges in the Ethiopian Criminal Process”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 
293- 294. Note: The corresponding standard of proof used in inquisitorial systems is 
what’s known as conviction in time of the judge. Similar to the beyond reasonable 
doubt standard, this sets the bar high for the prosecution to prove the crime by 
requiring the judge to favor the defendant in cases of doubt. See Mirjan R. Damaska
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constitutional provision upholding the principle of presumption of innocence, 
the argument for applying this standard is all the more relevant.
The other issue that needs to be addressed is what degree of proof is required 
of the defendant to rebut the evidence of the prosecution once he is called to 
enter into his defenses. It is argued that the accused need only produce evidence 
that would taint the prosecution’s evidence with reasonable doubt; he is not 
required to prove more.41 When the case for the defense is concluded, the court 
is to give its final judgment on the guilt of the accused.42 Hence, on the 
conclusion of all the evidence, first by the prosecutor and then by the defendant, 
if the court finds that there exists a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the 
accused then it is to acquit him; but if his guilt has been established by the 
prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant will be found guilty as 
charged.
2.3 The Draft Evidence Rules
The Draft Evidence Rules was a document prepared in 1967 that never came 
into force. It was meant to supplement the Criminal Procedure Code of 1961 and 
the Civil Procedure Code of 1965. Although not a binding source of law, it has 
influenced the Ethiopian legal community and court decisions in terms of 
providing a reference for basic evidentiary notions. It still forms the major part 
of what law students study in their law of evidence classes.
Article 81 of the Draft states that the burden of proof lies on the party who 
wishes to rely on the facts he asserts.43 In light of the provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, the burden of proof in criminal cases lies on the prosecution. 
Based on the provision discussing exceptions to the burden of proof in criminal 
cases,44 we can infer the following points: (1) The Draft Evidence Rules 
recognize the beyond a reasonable doubt standard; (2) What is required of the 
accused while rebutting the case presented by the prosecution when called to 
enter into his defenses is to raise reasonable doubts about what is presented by 
the prosecutor, nothing more; (3) If the accused wishes to rely on any legal 
exception, he will bear the evidential burden of proof (while the legal burden 
remains with the prosecutor); and (4)The prosecution bears the burden of 
proving each and every element of the charged crime.
(1973), “Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: 
A Comparative Study”, Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 1591, p. 558, available at 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1591>
41 Worku, supra note 33, p. 130.
42 Cr. Pro. Code, Art. 149.
43 Draft Evidence Rules, Art. 81, (1960 E.C., Unpublished).
44 Id, Art. 84.
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2.4 The Criminal Justice Administration Policy
The Criminal Justice Administration Policy was adopted by the Council of 
Ministers in March 2011 to direct basic governmental actions and decisions in 
enforcing the criminal justice system in line with constitutional principles, rules 
and values.45 Its objectives include improving the various aspects of the criminal 
justice system and providing indicators for laws within the system that need to 
be introduced and others that need amendment.46
in outlining the principles and strategies on which it is based, the Policy 
confirms the commitment to uphold and enforce constitutional rules and 
principles as well as the various international legal instruments to which 
Ethiopia is a party. ‘The decision-making process in criminal proceedings’, it 
continues, shall be one in which ‘the innocent are properly sorted out apart from 
the guilty.’47 The Policy is applicable on all bodies and institutions that take part 
in criminal matters and the criminal justice system.48
Part Four of the policy contains provisions that are meant to improve the 
effectiveness and fairness of the criminal justice system. In a section titled 
‘circumstances under which the burden of proof may shift to the accused’, it 
envisages the possibility that the defendant may be required to prove his 
innocence after the public prosecutor has ascertained only certain basic facts.49 
However, the procedure that is laid down under our Criminal Procedure Code 
and the presumption of innocence dictate otherwise.
The purpose of the notion of presumption of innocence and setting the 
standard of proof as high as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is to protect 
innocent individuals from wrongful convictions. It stems from the assumption 
that it is better to err on the side of impunity rather than find an innocent person 
guilty. And this is because of the serious consequences that may result from the 
case as well as the stigma associated with being a convict. The more serious the 
crime, the more we must insist on the proper enforcement of this high standard 
(since serious crimes entail dire consequences such as long incarceration or even 
death). The Criminal Policy, on the other hand, has allowed relaxing of this 
standard in some of the most serious crimes in our system.
45 Council of Ministers of the FDRE (2011), The Criminal Justice Administration Policy 
of 2011, (Hereinafter Crim. Policy), Sec. 1.1; For a detailed discussion of this policy 
and its implications, see generally, Simeneh, supra note 40, pp. 282- 284.
46 Crim. Policy, Sec. 1.3.
47 Id., Sec. 1.4.
48 Id., Sec. 1.6.
49 Id., Sec. 4.4.
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2.5. The Draft Criminal Procedure Code
The drafting of a new code of criminal procedure has been underway for a 
number of years now. It is meant to be applicable in both Federal and State 
courts in the country.50 The draft has undergone several revisions and substantial 
changes may take place before it is submitted to parliament and possibly 
become a binding law. The following discussion is based on the Draft by the 
Ministry of Justice as it stood in 2003 E.C. (2011) and numerous changes may 
have been made to it since. Its provisions relating to the issue of burden and 
standard of proof are discussed here as useful indicators of where our law is 
generally headed in dealing with these issues.
The Draft reiterates the constitutional principles of presumption of innocence 
and freedom from self-incrimination.51 It states that the prosecution bears the 
burden to prove and ascertain the crimes charged while the accused has the right 
to defend himself. However, the same provision goes on to provide for 
exceptions to this rule. It states: “Notwithstanding the principle [set above] 
where the accused is charged with crimes against the constitutional order, 
terrorism, corruption or conspiracy, or when the law provides, the burden of 
proof may shift to the accused upon the prosecution proving the primary 
facts.”52 Another provision adds that the accused shall bear the burden of proof 
if he wants to rely on an affirmative defense or to prove alibi.53 The Draft 
further stipulates that ‘it shall be considered that the accused has committed the 
offence when the charge has been proved sufficiently.’54 The court is to record a 
verdict of not guilty and acquit the defendant when the prosecutor fails to prove 
the charge sufficiently or the defendant, through his evidence, sufficiently 
proves that he did not commit the crime.55
Although this Draft has accomplished the commendable task of filling the 
multiple gaps found in the 1961 Criminal Procedure Code, it still leaves many 
questions unanswered in relation with burden and standard of proof. In 
providing exceptions to the rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proof, it 
does not specify whether it is the legal or the evidential proof that shifts to the
50 Ministry of Justice (2003 E.C), Draft Criminal Procedure Code, (Unpublished, 
Amharic), Preamble, Art. 1.
51 Id, Art. 5; The Amharic version reads which is also the
expression the FDRE Constitution uses under Art. 20(3) to describe presumption of 
innocence.
52 Id, Art. 5(3).
53 Id, Art. 380.
54 Id, Art. 396.
55 Ibid.; It reads: “9^a h't nnt hrt07m
Artnnt h07m &c& a* nM
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defendant.56 It allows such shift in very serious crimes such as terrorism. In 
stipulating the requisite standard of proof, it simply provides that the charge 
needs to be ‘sufficiently proved’ which is far from an adequate description. 
What does ‘sufficient’ mean? Should the court convict the accused on the 
balance of probabilities or do we require a higher standard? It further states that 
the court is to acquit the defendant when he ‘sufficiently proves that he did not 
commit the crime.’ This clearly deviates from the presumption of innocence and 
the principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proof, to which the Draft 
Criminal Procedure Code claims to be committed. The Draft has thus failed to 
discharge its expressly stated objectives of upholding constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of individuals.
3. Presumptions in Ethiopian Criminal Law
Ethiopia’s 2004 Criminal Code stipulates that “[a] crime is only completed 
when all its legal, material and moral ingredients are present.”57 The same 
provision which indicates the legal, material and moral elements of a crime 
states that “[a] crime is punishable where the Court has found the crime proved 
and deserving of punishment.”58 A joint reading of these two stipulations shows 
us that all the three elements have been proved for a Court to find it proved and 
‘deserving of punishment’. Art. 57(1) of the Code reiterates the requirement of 
the existence of the mental element by stating: “No one can be punished for a 
crime unless he has been found guilty thereof under the law. A person is guilty 
if, being responsible for his acts, he commits a crime either intentionally or by 
negligence.” And since, as discussed under Section 2 above, the requisite 
standard of proof for criminal proceedings in the Ethiopian legal system, is 
expected to be beyond a reasonable doubt, all the three elements of a crime need 
to be proved at the thresholds of this standard.59
There are, however, some provisions that presume the existence of one or 
more of these three ingredients thereby relieving the prosecution from the need 
to prove them. One such provision is Article 43 that provides for ‘liability for
56 Although these two are theoretically distinct, one scholar validly questions the 
practical significance of distinguishing between the two when the evidential burden is 
shifted to the accused. He argues, since it is nearly impossible for the defendant to 
discharge this burden, it is equivalent to requiring him to bear the legal burden. See 
Dingwall, supra note12, p. 457.
57 Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proc. No. 414/2004, 
(Hereinafter Cr. Code), Preamble, Art.23(2).
58 Cr. Code, Art. 23(4).
59 For a detailed discussion of elements of a crime that need to be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt See Simeneh, supra note 40, pp. 289-291 (Sec. 2.2.1.).
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crimes committed through the mass media’.60 By presuming the existence of the 
moral element of the crime, the provision not only relieves the prosecutor from 
having to prove it, but also forbids the defendant from introducing any evidence 
to prove its absence.
A provision headed ‘Presumption of intent to obtain advantage or to injure’ 
also equates the material element with the criminal act and relieves the 
prosecutor of the need to prove the mental element of the crime- an essential 
ingredient that needs proof as per Art. 23 of the Code.61 In this connection 
Simeneh has noted that ‘.this presumption is rebuttable and the defendant may 
produce contrary evidence. However, disproving a presumed state of mind is 
more difficult than proving it. Thus, the burden on the defendant is 
unreasonable.’62 Article 419 on ‘Possession of unexplained property’ also 
requires the defendant to give a ‘satisfactory explanation’ of the sources of such 
income/property for possession of which he was charged.63
Article 477 of the Code criminalizing ‘Dangerous vagrancy’ raises some 
questions. According to this provision, a person may be found guilty of this 
crime when the prosecution proves that such person possessed ‘weapons or 
instruments fitted by their nature to the commission of a crime.’64 Another 
provision on the use of poisonous or narcotic and psychotropic drugs also 
criminalizes any person who ‘plants, buys, receives, makes, possesses, sells or 
delivers’ these substances.65 At first glance these words may seem to require the 
prosecutor to prove intention. But a question arises whether it is sufficient to 
prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the defendant intentionally planted, 
bought or possessed such substance, or whether the prosecutor should go on to 
prove that the defendant knew of the nature of the substance under his control. 
Moreover the question as to who bears the burden of proving that the accused 
had this knowledge deserves attention. These provisions seem to imply that
60 Cr. Code, Art. 43(5).
61 Cr. Code, Art. 403; it reads “Unless evidence is produced to the contrary, where it is 
proved that the material element (the act) has been committed as defined in a 
particular Article providing for a crime of corruption perpetrated to obtain or procure 
undue advantage or to cause injury, such act shall be presumed to have been 
committed with intent to obtain for oneself or to procure for another an undue 
advantage or to injure the right or interest of a third person.”
62 Simeneh, supra note 40, p. 304.
63 The Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court has given a recent ruling on this 
provision which is discussed in Section 4.
64 Cr. Code, Art. 477(2); See also Vagrancy Control Proclamation, Proc. No. 384/2004, 
Art. 4 expanding on the definition of ‘Vagrancy’.
65 Cr. Code, Art. 525 (4)(a).
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knowledge of the nature of the object is presumed and it is up to the defendant 
to prove the absence of such knowledge.
Some controversies have ensued from similar provisions found in the laws of 
other countries. Criticizing the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 of England (which 
also stipulated that possession was to be criminalized), Dingwall wrote:66
... [Possession is an inherently ‘neutral’ concept that does not in itself carry 
any implication of moral blameworthiness. [The requirement of ‘possession’ 
under... the... Act 1971] is in effect an offence of strict liability as there is 
no further mens rea requirement that the defendant has to be aware that the 
item he was in possession of is a controlled drug.
Yet another provision that introduces a presumption against the defendant is 
found in Art. 675(3) according to which the mental element of ‘intent to 
obtain. an unjustifiable enrichment’ required for this crime of breach of trust is 
presumed to exist where the defendant is ‘unable upon call, to produce, or repay 
the thing or sum entrusted. ’67
in addition to the crimes specified in the Criminal Code, other pieces of 
legislation promulgated over the years have added to the list of offences that are 
punishable as crimes in Ethiopia. Some of these proclamations have some 
import on the issue of standard of proof. The Anti-Corruption Proclamation of 
2005 contains a provision on the standard of proof that is required to prove that 
the defendant ‘benefited from criminal conduct’ and proof of ‘the amount to be 
recovered.’ In these cases, the provision holds that the standard of proof ‘shall 
be that applicable in civil proceedings.’68 The prosecutor need only show the 
existence of some basic facts for the evidential burden to be shifted to the 
defendant; the accused is then expected to rebut the presumption of guilt that 
stands against him.69
Likewise, the Value Added Tax Proclamation provides that the manager of 
an entity ‘is treated as having committed the offence [with which the entity itself 
is charged] and is liable to a penalty under this proclamation.’70 It provides an 
exception to this rule by stating that the person will not be liable if the crime 
was committed without his knowledge or consent and if the person exercised 
‘the degree of care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
66 Dingwall, supra note 12, p. 454.
67 Cr. Code, Art. 675 (3).
68 Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation, 
Proc. No. 434/2005, Art. 33.
69 See, generally, Hiwote Mekonnen (2001), Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof 
under the Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation, 
(Faculty of Law, AAU, Unpublished).
70 Value Added Tax Proclamation, Proc. No. 285/2002, Art. 56(1).
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have exercised in comparable circumstances to prevent the commission of the 
offence.’71 Although it does not specify who is to prove this exception, it is 
presumably up to the defendant to show the existence of these facts. The 
Turnover Tax and the Excise Tax proclamations also contain similar 
provisions.72
The presumptions contained in these legislations have the effect of shifting 
the evidential burden of proof to the accused and he is required to adduce 
evidence to prove otherwise.73 Similar legislations that shift the evidential 
burden of proof to the defendant are found in other legal systems that recognize 
presumption of innocence and the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In a case contesting such a law in England, the House of Lords held that the 
presumption of innocence protected in the European Convention of Human 
Rights is not absolute and hence, not every reverse burden of proof would be 
contrary to the Convention.74 The European Court of Human Rights similarly 
held that provisions containing a reverse burden of proof can be compatible with 
the presumption of innocence as long as they are ‘confined within reasonable 
limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain 
the rights of the defense.'75 The Privy Council found such limitation on the right 
to be presumed innocent as an ‘implicit flexibility’ that ‘allows a balance to be 
drawn between the interest of the person charged and the state.’76
The recognition of presumption of innocence under the FDRE Constitution, 
some argue, is an absolute right that admits no limitations.77 For proponents of
71 Id, Sub. 3.
72 See Turnover Tax Proclamation, Proc. No. 308/2002, Art. 33; Excise Tax 
Proclamation, Proc. No. 307/2002, Art.24; Customs Proclamation, Proc. No. 
622/2009, Art.92(3). See also, The National Bank of Ethiopia Establishment 
Proclamation, Proclamation No. 591/2008, Art. 26.
73 Here the standard of proof required of the defendant is the civil standard of 
‘preponderance of evidence. ’
74 Emson, supra note 11, p. 428.
75 Salabiaku v. France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 at 388; Hoang v. France (1992) 16 EHRR 
53 at 78 (as quoted in Id., p. 428); Emson lays down certain criteria that need to be 
met for such provisions to be compatible with the presumption of innocence. Such 
shifting of legal burden must be: 1.directed towards a legitimate public objective, 
2.proportional, and 3. Necessary (in the sense that an evidential burden on the 
accused would not suffice to achieve the same objectives). (See, generally, Emson, 
supra note 11, pp. 427- 434).
76 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Lee Kwong-Kut [1993] 3 WLR 329. (as quoted in 
Id, p. 429).
77 Simeneh, supra note 40, p. 288; the House of Lords however found that the 
presumption of innocence is not absolute and some derogation in some circumstances 
is acceptable. (See Dingwall, supra note 12, p. 457).
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this view, these subsequent pieces of legislation that shift the evidential burden 
of proof to the defendant would be clearly unconstitutional. Even if we were to 
accept certain limitations to the principle, whether our laws would meet the 
strict criteria set out for compatibility like those of England is debatable.78
4. The Practice of Ethiopia’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) 
regarding Standard of Proof in Criminal Proceedings
After briefly touching on court practice in general in relation to the standard of 
proof, this section provides a summary of select cases decided by the Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Bench and analyzes them to identify their implications 
on the issue.
4.1 Court Practice: General Overview
Although the writer believes that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is 
recognized under the Ethiopian legal system, the fact remains that it is nowhere 
mentioned in any binding legal instrument. The legal academia seems to be of 
the opinion that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard can be inferred from, 
inter alia, the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence and hence 
courts should apply this rigorous standard in criminal cases.79 Legal research 
done in related topics seem to take the existence of the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard for granted.80 The practice, on the other hand, depicts a 
completely different picture with various courts using very different 
formulations of the degree of proof required of the prosecutor to prove the guilt 
of the defendant. Although one may frequently find the beyond a reasonable 
doubt in older judgments given by Ethiopian courts, the current trend seems to 
have digressed from that. Since there has not been a change in the normative 
standard, such development appears to have stemmed from a change in the 
attitude of the legal community. As workuYaze duly observes:81
... plenty of court cases prove that Ethiopian courts and litigating parties 
ritually invoke proof beyond reasonable doubt. This does not mean, 
however, that they always employ this same standard, understand what it 
means and apply it in its proper sense. To the contrary, they use various
78 The House of Lords in England, for example, found that the presumption of innocence 
is not absolute and some derogation in some circumstances is acceptable. (See Id, p. 
457).
79 See, in general, Worku, supra note 33; Simeneh, supra note 40; Wondwossen, supra 
note 31.
80 See, for example, Hiwote, supra note 69.
81 Worku, supra note 33, p. 133 (footnote omitted).
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expressions including ‘beyond doubt’, ‘beyond the least shadow of doubt’, 
‘absolutely beyond any doubt’ and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and so on.
4.2 The Jurisprudence of the Cassation Bench of the Federal 
Supreme Court
Proclamation 454/2005 has rendered interpretations of law by the Federal 
Supreme Court, Cassation Division binding on federal and regional courts of all 
levels.82 In addition to their significance as part of court practice, therefore, the 
decisions of the Cassation Bench are binding sources of statutory interpretation 
on cases that involve similar issues, and other courts are required to abide by the 
Cassation Bench’s interpretations of legal provisions.
Although the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench has nowhere clearly 
stated the standard of proof to be employed in criminal cases, there have been a 
number of cases brought before it contesting either the sufficiency of evidence 
upon which lower courts made their decisions or the degree of proof itself. In 
such cases the Court has rendered its opinion on whether or not the decision of 
the trial court is justified without however going into an analysis of the standard 
of proof itself.
We will, here-below briefly look at the relevant parts of thirteen FSC 
Cassation Bench decisions followed by a brief analysis of their significance and 
implications. The cases discussed will help us see, not only the position of the 
Cassation Bench, but also the line of reasoning of various courts from which the 
Cassation petition is brought.
4.2.1 Court Decisions
a) Minase A. v. Public Prosecutor 83
The case, charging the defendant with the crime of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
was first brought before the Benishangul Gumuz High Court, and to the State’s 
Supreme Court on appeal both of which found the defendant guilty as charged. 
He contested such decision claiming that he was not given the chance to defend 
himself and brought an application before the FSC Cassation Bench. The Court 
stated: ‘[s]ince the guilt of the applicant has been established by sufficient 
evidence in the lower court, we found that neither the process nor the decision 82 83 *
82 Federal Courts Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation, Proc. No. 454/2005, 
Art.2(4).
83 Minae A. v. Public Prosecutor (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 12025)
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 4, pp. 115-116.
shows the existence of a fundamental error of law’84 (emphasis added), and it 
upheld the decisions of the State courts.
b) Kurat T. et. al. v. Public Prosecutor85
The defendants were first brought before the North Gondar High Court in 
Amhara Region charged with attempted aggravated homicide which, after 
hearing the prosecution case, acquitted them without calling them to enter into 
their defenses. The case was brought before the FSC Cassation Bench by the 
defendants contesting the appellate decision of the Amhara Supreme Court 
which remanded the case back to the trial court after finding that prosecution 
witnesses have established the guilt of the accused and that the defendants 
‘should defend themselves to the extent of their established culpability.’86 87 The 
trial court, after hearing the defense, held that the testimony of the prosecution 
witnesses has not been rebutted by the defense witnesses and hence found the 
defendants guilty as charged. The FSC Cassation Bench, after looking into the 
evidence presented before the trial court, held that the defendants should have 
been charged under ordinary homicide instead and found them guilty under that
• • 87provision.
c) Oromia Prosecutor General v. Zerihun T.88
In this case, the trial court- namely the West Wolega Zone High Court of 
Oromia Region, after hearing the case of the prosecution, acquitted the 
defendant who was charged for the crime of rape. The court held that the 
prosecutor failed to establish the facts of the case as found in the charge. On 
appeal, the decision was upheld by the Oromia Supreme Court and the 
Cassation Bench of the same court. The public prosecutor brought a petition 
before the Federal Cassation Bench arguing that the decisions of these three 
courts were erroneous.
The Court noted that five prosecution witnesses, a police report as well as 
medical evidence were presented before the trial court. it examined whether the
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84
85
86
‘Aotaot n^c aF p+^nnF bo not p+07mnF n^^...
PAT Oo+F Pn,PO£ (Id, p. 116).
Ato Kurat T. et. al. v. Public Prosecutor (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 
22514) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 7, pp. 262-264. 
‘+hOFT n^a AT ^ObffT P+^mh^OT®' n+^mh^OT® M'lhiV .&7OA-’
(Id, p. 262).
87 It based its decision on Art. 113(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides 
for the case where an accused may be convicted for a crime other than the one 
charged with if the crime proved by evidence is of lesser gravity and all its elements 
are also found as elements of the charged crime.
88 Oromia Prosecutor General v. Zerihun T. (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 
31731) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 7, pp. 278-282.
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prosecution’s case was sufficient in light of the legal elements of the crime and 
concluded that the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecutor are 
complementary and ‘properly establish the occurrence of the offence’ (emphasis 
added).89 The Cassation Bench criticized the decision of the trial court for 
disregarding the prosecution evidence stating that every court must rely on 
evidence presented to it to decide on the contested issues and reach a decision. It 
went on to add that in this case the evidence brought forth by the prosecutor 
‘clearly ascertains the commission of the crime’ (emphasis added). And hence 
the failure on the part of the lower courts to take this evidence into account ‘is 
not only contrary to the law but also very damaging to the cause of justice.’ 
Accordingly the Court quashed the judgments given by the lower courts and 
ordered that the defendant be called on to defend himself ‘since the commission 
of the crime has been established by the prosecution’s evidence.’90
d) Amhara Region Justice Bureau Public Prosecutor v. Kebede W.91
The defendant was charged with the crime of arson and intentional homicide (or 
negligent homicide in the alternative) and the case was entertained by an 
Amhara High Court which found the accused guilty of arson and negligent 
homicide. The Amhara Supreme Court on appeal found that the mental element 
that constitutes the crime of negligent homicide was not present and found the 
defendant not guilty of this crime, but upheld the conviction on the crime of 
arson.
The Cassation Bench in this case found that the Amhara Supreme Court 
failed to take into account the whole content of the evidence presented by the 
public prosecutor. It held that such evidence on the whole indicates that the 
defendant purposely set the house of the victim on fire and that he should also 
be held liable for negligent homicide for the persons who died.
e) Jamila M. et. al. v. Federal First Instance Public Prosecutor92
The case was first brought before the Federal First Instance Court where the 
defendants were charged with using arbitrary action to safeguard a right. After 
recording the defendants’ plea of not guilty and hearing the evidence of the * * * *
89
90
91
92
‘^a tin  wnT^ ^o^s^T ... ego ncnT^
■TL&m *czF nmn ^£0^7 9T^==’ (Id, p. 281).
+mz bn n+^n^ n+^n^ p+hoonF oaot£0^ c^^ph^nF oo^v
MAhA -0rt9A::’ (Id, p. 282).
Amhara Region Justice Bureau Public Prosecutor v. Kebede W. (Federal Supreme 
Court, Cassation File No. 35697) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, 
Vol. 9, pp. 2-4.
Jamila M. et. al. v. Federal First Instance Public Prosecutor (Federal Supreme Court, 
Cassation File No. 38161) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 9,
pp. 11-12.
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prosecution, the trial court ordered the defendants to enter into their defenses. 
The court then held the accused guilty stating that the evidence presented in 
defense ‘do not suffice to rebut the prosecution’s evidence.’93
Upon the petition presented to it, the Cassation Bench framed the issue on 
whether or not the action of the defendants constitutes a crime. Citing Article 23 
of the Criminal Code, it concluded that not all the three ingredients of the crime 
are present, and accordingly found that the defendants were free of any criminal 
liability.
f) Shega M. v. Oromia Region Public Prosecutor 94
The petition was brought by the defendants contesting the verdict given by the 
Oromia High Court finding them guilty of homicide which was confirmed by 
the Oromia Supreme Court and the Cassation Bench of the same court. In 
answer to the petition, the prosecutor responded that ‘since the applicants’ guilt 
has been established without a doubt through the evidence presented, the verdict 
as well as the sentence given by the lower court should stand’ (emphasis added).
In this case, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench held that it was not 
within its jurisdiction to go into ‘particulars of the offence and weighing of 
evidence.’95 The Court looked into whether the action of the defendants would 
fall under legitimate defense, and concluded that the defendants had not adduced 
evidence to prove that the elements of such justification exist. Therefore, it 
found that the defendants should be held liable under extenuated homicide since 
the circumstances indicate that they exceeded the limits of legitimate defense.
g) Burqeso W. v. Public Prosecutor96
The case was first brought before the High Court in Gamo where the defendant 
was charged with homicide. The trial court heard the prosecution case and after 
calling the accused to defend himself, found the accused guilty as charged 
because he did not present any defense and thus failed to rebut the evidence 
presented by the prosecution. The defendant, in his petition to the FSC 93 94 * 96
93 pa^a^f p^hoh? no^s^F p^a no^s^F ono+nnA nt A££<v^> (Id, p.
94 11).
4 Shega M. v. Oromia Region Public Prosecutor (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation 
File No. 43501) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 10, pp.
196-199.
e^ pno^s w p , n^u one on F^F ^Am? pn^p no^^v
n^e ^/aF p+07m^? ^AV7e e^o n^+nA n^ ^7* ^^F n^...
OTe^^A::’ (Ibid.).
96 Burqeso W. v. Public Prosecutor (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 41248) 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 10, pp. 207-208.
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Cassation Bench, claimed that the lower court convicted him ‘without the public 
prosecutor proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’ and upon false evidence.97
The Cassation Bench held that the fact that the applicant committed the 
criminal offence was appropriately established by the public prosecutor through 
evidence and ascertained by the lower courts.98 It then stated, similarly with the 
case discussed above, that it was outside its jurisdiction to examine issues 
involving weighing of evidence and hence rejected the claim of the applicant.99
h) Girma T. v. Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 100
The defendant was charged with a corruption offence, and he brought an 
application before the Cassation Bench claiming that the public prosecutor had 
not discharged his burden of proof as required by law and that the evidence 
produced by the prosecutor in fact proves his innocence. He also contested the 
decision of the Federal Supreme Court that affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court. And hence, he argued, the case presented by the prosecution is not 
sufficient to conclude that he committed the offence and the guilty verdict was 
based on the false testimony of prosecution witnesses.
The Cassation Bench gave an analysis on the issue of burden of proof in 
criminal proceedings basing itself on basic principles of evidence law and the 
applicable legal provisions. It stated that before the defendant is called to enter 
into his defenses, the court needs to ascertain that the pieces of evidence brought 
forth by the prosecutor are complementary. Failing this test, it continued, the 
trial court’s decision requiring the accused to defend himself was inappropriate. 
From the provisions of Articles 141 and 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
we can gather that the prosecutor has the duty to prove that the defendant
97
98
99
...Pffl?£A h^hTPFF TC^A nw^nF
nooF? Tfp? p<^nn ^==’ (Id, p. 208).
tin •notn efco nmn ‘m.pim’i
PnFT ¥C* ftFT V^::’ (Id).
It stated £0 T^F niX.&.^ F7-ot?^^F E">+» 80(3)(0) E^ nEFK *TC 25/1988 
E7+fr 10 *7^7 ^m.F ^m^FF P^V Pti^ hOPF E7% P^h.S
^H^7 n^rthF P^m^F ^Am? 00^^^ E71C ^F£ P+n£VF E££rt^::’
(Id.) The Court reiterated this position that it was beyond its legal mandate to go into 
weighing of evidence in a number of subsequent cases. In Volume 12 of the Court’s 
Decisions itself, the Court stated this in the following cases: File no. 59855, File No. 
52075, File No. 57446, File No. 64813, File No. 61275, File No. 66767, File No. 
55649.
100 Girma T. v. Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Federal Supreme 
Court, Cassation File No. 51706) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench 
Decisions, Vol. 10, pp. 211-218.
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committed the crime mentioned in the charge by sufficient evidence 101 We 
say that this burden of proof is sufficiently discharged when the evidence 
presented have reliability and are capable of proving the charge. Reliability 
of evidence is to be checked by looking at whether it is coherent and does 
not contain contradictory elements...
After giving the above explanation the Court decided that the public prosecutor 
had not effectively discharged his burden of proof and ordered that the 
defendant be set free.
i) Aregahegn M. v. Federal Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission102
The case was first brought before the Federal High Court which found the 
defendants guilty of the crime of corruption. The decision was confirmed by the 
Federal Supreme Court on appeal and one of the defendants brought this 
petition. in his application for cassation, the defendant contended that the 
prosecution evidence does not establish his guilt ‘beyond the appropriate 
doubt’103, that he was convicted and sentenced simply for giving his legal 
opinion, and that this constitutes a ‘fundamental error of law.’ The prosecutor 
responded by saying that the claim of the applicant involves an issue of fact and 
not an issue of law, and thus the decisions of the lower courts should be upheld.
The Court did not frame the standard of proof as an issue and instead held 
that the evidence presented does not constitute the crime of corruption and that 
the defendant should have been charged under a different provision of ‘crimes 
committed in dereliction of duty’.
j) Oromia Region Public Prosecutor v. Eyosiyas A. et. al. 104
The case was first brought before the East Shoa zone High Court where the first 
defendant was charged with aggravated homicide involving two victims while 
the other four defendants were accused for having participated in the offence in 
different capacities. The trial court passed a guilty verdict for the first and third 
defendants and found the other three not guilty stating that they had defended 
themselves. On appeal, the application of the public prosecutor was rejected and 101 102 103 104
101 A^AhT Obfr P+7rt0^i PffliEA .frCzT OATpR P^fi^T A'iflrtOT
hffliErt? ^l-^CAT tin 4TC 141 149 ZiPlPT rt^^T £^AA-’ (Id, p.
216).
102 Aregahegn M. v. Federal Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission (Federal Supreme 
Court, Cassation File No. 43049) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench 
Decisions, Vol. 12, pp. 217-220.
103 P^ft iwi ‘nfiCZ ffliEA h+7R®‘ TCmA AWfl-n^::’ (Id. 218).
104 Oromia Region Public Prosecutor v. Eyosiyas A. et. al. (Federal Supreme Court, 
Cassation File No. 45595) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 
12, pp. 229-237.
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the Oromia Supreme Court decided that the guilt of the third defendant had not 
been properly established and set her free.105 The prosecutor again appealed to 
the Cassation Bench of the Oromia Supreme Court which did not accept the 
claim of the prosecutor and instead held that the first defendant should have 
been charged under ordinary homicide and reduced his sentence.
In its petition for cassation, the prosecutor contested this last decision 
concerning the sentence of the first defendant and the verdict of the other four. 
After framing the issues for each defendant, the Court reversed the decision of 
the Cassation Bench of the Oromia Supreme Court as regards the first defendant 
and held that he should be convicted under aggravated homicide as first decided 
by the trial court. The Cassation Bench gave an analysis of the evidence 
presented against the second defendant and decided that the lower courts had 
erroneously acquitted him. It reversed the verdict and convicted him. With 
regard to the third defendant, the Court noted that the Oromia Supreme Court 
found that the evidence presented by the prosecutor does not sufficiently 
establish her participation in the crime. As it had done in a number of cases, it 
went on to state that weighing of evidence would be beyond the mandate of the 
court to rectify fundamental error of law; and disregarded the prosecutor’s 
petition against the verdict given on the third defendant. However, the court 
analyzes the evidence presented before the lower courts. The relevant part of 
this judgment reads:
The evidence clearly shows that [the third defendant] intentionally aided the 
first defendant after commission of the offence in order to save him from 
prosecution and punishment. And this implies criminal responsibility... 
Therefore, although this Court cannot go into weighing of evidence, [we 
found that]. the decision of the Oromia Supreme Court, appellate bench 
finding the third defendant free of criminal responsibility despite what has 
been sufficiently established... is a fundamental error of law.106
The Court gave a similar analysis of the evidence as regards the fourth 
defendant and reversed the decision of the lower courts finding both the third 
and fourth defendants guilty of participating in a crime of aggravated homicide.
k) Awet T. v. Tigrai Public Prosecutor107
The accused was convicted for participation in an offence of aggravated 
homicide along with other criminal defendants before the Eastern Zone High 
Court of Tigrai Region and the decision was confirmed by the Tigrai Supreme 105 106 107
105 ‘.3? Tmz zcz-u} nmn a a t o n n A  rhigP p^c vc*
fth nw EWMn-U +fflh£A:=’ (Id, p. 230).
106 Id, p. 234.
107 Awet T .v. Tigrai Public Prosecutor (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 
57644) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 12, pp. 264- 268.
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Court as well as the Cassation Bench of the same court. In his petition for 
cassation, the defendant claimed that the prosecution evidence presented before 
the trial court does not establish his participation in the crime and that his 
conviction, in the absence of any evidence establishing his guilt, was a 
fundamental error of law.
The Cassation Bench noted that the lower courts that had the power to weigh 
the evidence presented failed to ascertain in their judgments that the prosecutor 
discharged his burden of proving the elements of the crime under which the 
defendant was charged for participation. The Court observed that the judgment 
of the trial court itself shows that the prosecutor did not prove the criminal 
liability of the defendant by sufficient evidence.108 The Cassation Bench stated 
that the trial court should have acquitted the defendant as per Article 141 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code without calling on the defendant to enter into his 
defenses. The Cassation Bench found this decision as one involving a 
fundamental error of law and reversed it.
1) Afework L. et. al. v. SNNPR Prosecutor109
The defendants were charged with aggravated homicide before the Hawassa 
High Court. The Court found that although the prosecution did not present any 
direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence was ‘sufficient and convincing to 
reach a conclusion’110 and found them guilty of ordinary homicide. The decision 
was confirmed by the SNNPR Supreme Court. In their petition to the FSC 
Cassation Bench the defendants claimed that their individual guilt had not been 
ascertained and that none of the prosecution witnesses were direct witnesses.
The Cassation Bench stated that circumstantial evidence is allowed under the 
Criminal Procedure Code; and that since the prosecution evidence ascertained 
that the victim’s death was caused by the defendants, they shall not be free from 
criminal liability whether or not their individual participation was proved 
separately.111 It also stated that the guilty verdict decided by the trial court was 
something to be deduced from the evidence, and hence falls outside the mandate 108 109 110 111
108 ‘+m^ AOTAhT P+hOOnF? Pffl^EA .frCzF h+hOOnF Pffl^EA .frCzF P^V
0ffl?£A Pn,Phm£$ *CzT PABot not ^h^n P^C ftF...
n^O^®' hOA£® ototAOF (Id., p. 268).
109 Afework L. et. al. v. SNNPR Prosecutor (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 
75922) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Decisions, Volume 13, pp. 329- 331.
110 n^^d !hi ‘nhtn p+07®f ^av7CT... zcx* n+ooFT p+abot nAhoa
^h^nVFT® 0t^ AT^a otV^V® +7^7A::’ (Id., p. 329).
111 ‘rt^T tpp P^V® +^0C 0A^Ah¥T P+ABot hrtOT^v ^h^n® AO^A
Ehh+Ort *^h PF¥®7 +^0C PF¥® +h0fi AIAABot ,Ph^ ^h^n AA+^n-mr
Pnrt®r bCbC PP^AT® Pffl^EA AiWF®* n^0-nr ^V 0+^0C
0OT+^7fl m-n^AncvF hAB^F *CzF VI ^T® h^A ^,P£Ch PnTA
A££rt^::’ (Ibid.).
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of this court which only looks into issues of law. The Court found that even if it 
is said that it raises an issue of law in relation to whether it complies with Art. 
141 of the Criminal Procedure Code. it does not warrant the conclusion that 
they should have been acquitted before they were called to enter into their 
defenses. The Court decided that the defendants’ guilt had been ascertained by 
evidence that meets the standard required by the law of criminal procedure.112
m) Workneh K. et.al. v. SNNPR Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
Prosecutor 113
The case was first brought before the Hawassa High Court where the defendants 
were charged with a corruption crime of ‘possession of unexplained property’ 
under the Criminal Code. After hearing the evidence, the trial court acquitted the 
defendants finding that the evidence they presented rebutted the case of the 
prosecution.114 This decision was confirmed by the SNNPR Supreme Court. The 
Cassation Bench of this same court reversed these decisions and convicted the 
defendants stating that the evidence presented by the defense did not have 
sufficient probative value to rebut the case of the prosecution.
The Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court looked into whether the 
SNNPR Cassation Bench had the mandate to look into the evidence and render 
the decision that it did. Basing itself on the provisions of the Federal and 
Regional constitutions as well as a proclamation of the Region, it found that the 
SNNPR Cassation Court lacked the jurisdiction to evaluate facts and weigh 
evidence. The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench concluded that the 
decision given by the SNNPR Cassation Bench has a ‘fundamental error of 
law.’
The Court went further to make a distinction between evaluation of evidence, 
which lies outside the jurisdiction of cassation, and related issues such as the 
burden of proof. Since the latter is a question of law, it argued, the Cassation 
Bench can evaluate the decisions of lower courts and give a decision thereon. 
The Court examined the elements of Art. 419 of the Criminal Code which 
criminalizes “possession of unexplained property”, in light of the facts of the 
case. According to this provision it is up to the defendant to give a ‘satisfactory 
explanation’ of the source of the property for possession of which he was * 113 114
nmnt ‘nhCZ f+OimaT©^^ [£^m^A]...’ (Id, p. 331).
113 Workneh K. et. al. v. SNNPR Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Prosecutor 
(Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 63014) Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Decisions, Vol. 13, pp. 359- 365).
114 ‘A^Ah¥T f+rnZ! .Ph+nniV lA? h+hrtfrnF ... nM
hM-n£¥VN-’ (Id, p. 360).
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charged.115 Therefore, the Court stated that once the public prosecutor proves 
the existence of property in excess of the known legal income of the accused, it 
is up to the defendants to prove the exact source of such excess.116
The Court found that both the trial and the appellate courts failed to frame 
and examine these issues. it then stated the evidence that should have been 
required if such issues were framed. It found that the decisions of all the three 
courts contained fundamental error of law and remanded the case to the trial 
court so that these issues could be considered.
4.2.2 Analysis
The Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court has made some important 
findings in the cases discussed above. In Girma T. v. Federal Ethics and Anti­
Corruption Commission, for example, it unequivocally stated that the burden of 
proof is on the public prosecutor to prove all the particulars of the offence as 
mentioned in the charge. Accordingly, it acquitted the defendant after finding 
that the prosecutor did not prove all the elements of the crime. It restated the 
requirement under Article 141 of the Criminal Procedure Code by noting that 
the trial court must engage itself in weighing of evidence and order the acquittal 
of the accused if the evidence of the prosecution does not prove the particulars 
of the offence ‘sufficiently’ as mentioned in the charge (and is not sufficient to 
warrant conviction if unrebutted). And by sufficient evidence, the Court 
continued, it is meant that the evidence presented must be coherent, consistent, 
and must have the necessary probative value to prove the charge- the closest the 
court has come to defining what standard of proof is to be applied in criminal 
proceedings. In a similar case (Awet T. v. Tigrai Public Prosecutor), the Court 
held that if a court fails to acquit a defendant in the face of evidence that does 
not warrant conviction and instead orders him to enter into his defenses that 
decision would amount to a ‘fundamental error of law.’
In Workneh K. et.al., the FSC Cassation Bench gave a ruling on the 
controversial criminal provision of ‘possession of unexplained property’ looking 
into what was required of the defendant to discharge his burden of giving 
‘satisfactory explanation’ of the property in his possession. The Cassation 
Bench implied that what was required of the accused was much higher than 
simply raising doubts on the case of the prosecution.
A look at these cases shows that the standard of proof employed by the 
various regional and federal courts from which the cases were referred to 
cassation is not uniform. Some stated that the guilt of the accused was
115 Cr. Code, Art. 419(1).
116 Workneh K. et. al. v. SNNPR Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Prosecutor, 
supra note 113, p. 363.
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established by ‘sufficient evidence’ presented by the prosecutor while others 
held that the accused failed to ‘effectively rebut the case of the prosecution’ 
before passing a guilty verdict. The FSC Cassation Bench has also failed to 
develop a clear jurisprudence on the standard of proof that should be used in 
criminal cases. In Burqeso W. v. Public Prosecutor where the claimant clearly 
contested the standard of proof on the basis of which he was convicted, the 
Bench held that the guilt of the accused was ‘appropriately established’ by the 
prosecutor without, however, explaining what it meant by that. And in the case 
of Aregahegn M. v. Federal Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission, the Court 
failed to take up standard of proof as an issue for consideration.
The Court repeatedly held that the evidence presented before the trial courts 
was sufficient to warrant the convictions. Differing from the findings of the trial 
courts, the FSC Cassation Bench in some cases held that the guilt of the accused 
had been sufficiently established by the prosecution and, reversing the 
judgment, found the defendant guilty as charged. After a similar analysis, it held 
the reverse in some other cases and quashed a guilty verdict. In still others it 
went into examining the prosecution case after which it decided that the crime 
charged was not proved and instead convicted the defendant under a different 
provision containing a crime of lesser gravity.
In a civil case (Senait Temesgen v. Etifwork Bekele), the FSC Cassation 
Division had made a distinction between the issue of weight of evidence as an 
issue of fact and consideration of whether such evidence constitutes issue of 
law.117 It stated that the Court has the mandate to look into the latter, but not the 
former adding that the question of whether the established facts constitute the 
legal elements of an issue at hand squarely falls under its jurisdiction.118 Such 
analysis and distinction seem to be missing from its jurisprudence in criminal 
cases.
In various criminal cases, the Court repeatedly stated that it was beyond its 
mandate to go into weighing of evidence. However, we find that the Cassation 
Bench evaluated evidence in some cases. In Oromia Region Public Prosecutor 
v. Eyosiyas A. et. al., for example, the court discussed the evidence presented 
against each defendant based on which it changed the verdict given by the lower 
courts.119 Contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence of the accused 
and the requirement that his guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the FSC
117 Senait Temesgen v. Etifwork Bekele, (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 
44804) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Decisions, Vol. 11, pp. 525- 529.
118 Id., p. 528; The same was held in Ethiopian Commercial Bank v. Ashebir Tadesse et 
al. (Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 57288) Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Decisions, Vol. 12, pp. 506-511.
119 Oromia Region Public Prosecutor v. Eyosiya sAberra et. al., supra note 104.
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Cassation Division required higher thresholds of evidence from the defendant 
than what would suffice to raise doubts on the prosecutor’s case.
As mentioned earlier, the Cassation Bench has indeed raised some important 
points by restating the obligation of the public prosecutor to prove all elements 
of the crime. However, it has failed to clarify the requisite standard of proof in
criminal proceedings.120
Conclusion
The standard of proof significantly affects the outcome of cases that are brought 
before the court. in criminal cases where the two litigants are the state 
(represented by the public prosecutor) and an individual, the standard of proof 
required of the state to prove guilt is set high reflecting the need to protect the 
innocent individual from wrongful conviction. The beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard is the construction of this high standard in common law countries. It 
found its way into the Ethiopian legal system through the Criminal Procedure 
Code which was fashioned after the common law tradition and court practice set 
in place by British judges in the country after the Italian occupation. The right of 
the accused to be presumed innocent found in the FDRE Constitution and in 
various international instruments which are integral parts of Ethiopia’s law (by 
virtue of Article 9(2) of the FDRE Constitution) envisage the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.
while this is the general framework set in place, there are a number of laws 
that introduce presumptions in favor of the prosecutor. Such provisions in the 
Criminal Code as well as other criminal legislation have the effect of shifting 
the evidential burden of proof to the defendant as regards some element of the 
crime. The trend reflected in the Criminal Justice Administration Policy and the 
Draft Criminal Procedure Code also seems to suggest that the types of crimes 
for which a presumption against the accused exist are growing. Even though 
some exceptions to the rule can be introduced, no yardsticks have been 
developed that set out conditions these exceptions must meet. In the absence of 
such ‘limit to the limits', encroachment on the right of the individual to be 
presumed innocent may go unchecked as more presumptions continue to erode
120 Looking at the wording in some of the cases discussed, one may argue that the Court 
is in favor of the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard in determining guilt of the 
accused; a look at other cases, however, will lead us to conclude that the Court has 
not taken a clear stand on the issue. Even if we were to accept the position that the 
Court has accepted the ‘clear and sufficient evidence’ formulation, since the 
requisite standard of proof implied in the normative framework is the higher 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, such stand of the Court is not in 
accordance with the law.
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the prosecutor’s responsibility to prove all elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Apart from these exceptional provisions, even in the ordinary 
cases of crimes that form the bulk of what courts entertain on a daily basis, the 
practice in Ethiopia shows that many variations of the standard are being used 
by different courts.121 This has a number of implications on the criminal justice 
system as a whole.
The first caveat is that by deviating from the high standard of proof required 
in criminal cases, more innocent people may be convicted than what is 
considered tolerable.122 Although avoiding errors altogether would be an 
impossible task, the existence of a high degree of such errors greatly undermines 
the moral force of the criminal justice system. This in turn results in people 
losing faith in the criminal justice process.
Secondly, the prevalence of such divergent practice introduces a level of 
arbitrariness into the system. If courts employ various standards in reaching 
their verdict, the fate of the defendant will, at least partly, depend on which 
court and more particularly which judge before whom he is brought. Depending 
on these circumstances, therefore, a person accused of a crime may be convicted 
on a much lower threshold than another charged with the same crime. Such 
difference in treatment is a violation of the constitutional principle that all 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law. 
Article 4 of the Criminal Code holds that: “Criminal law applies to all alike. 
[n]o difference in treatment of criminals may be made except as provided by 
this Code.” Since the decision for conviction or acquittal ultimately lies with 
individual judges, the subjective element will inevitably affect the case. While 
some level of such variation may be tolerable, it must be checked to make sure 
that it does not amount to arbitrary outcomes in criminal cases.
Thirdly, the practice shows that enough attention is not being given to the 
issue of standard of proof in general. The reluctance of trial and appellate courts 
alike to discuss it even when it is raised as an issue for consideration by the
121 There seems to be a general understanding that courts must employ a more rigorous
standard of proof in criminal proceedings than in civil cases. (See Tariku C. v. 
Federal Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission (Federal Supreme Court, 
Cassation File No. 78470) Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench Decisions, Vol. 
15, pp. 352). The question, however, is how much more rigorous it should be.
122 Without doing an empirical research into the number of convictions and acquittals 
and such related issues, one cannot conclusively say that our system is erring on one 
side or the other. The existence of too many wrongful acquittals remains a 
possibility. However, having had the chance to observe a number of criminal 
proceedings entertained in federal first instance and high courts, I have noted that 
accused persons were convicted on evidence which, in my opinion, does not suffice 
to meet the rigorous standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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litigants attests to this; in some of the cases, the question of standard of proof as 
an issue of law was not properly distinguished from the factual issue of 
weighing the presented evidence. Courts mostly state that the evidence 
presented was ‘sufficient’ to warrant the guilty verdict. This statement is too 
vague and susceptible to discretion because it does not expressly state what is 
expected from courts in terms of specifying to what degree the prosecutor is 
required to prove guilt. The very purpose of the standard of proof is answering 
the question of what we mean by ‘sufficient evidence.’ A mere qualification of 
evidence as ‘sufficient’, as is done by various courts, only tells us that a certain 
standard has been met and not what that standard is.
The importance of defining and correctly applying the standard of proof in 
criminal cases cannot be overstated. The object and purposes of the criminal 
law, such as ensuring peace and security of the society and punishing the guilty, 
hinge on the correctness of the decisions of courts. The standard of proof, 
reflecting the acceptable ratio of wrongful convictions to wrongful acquittals, 
plays a major role on the outcome of such decisions. Pending legislative remedy 
to fill the gap that now exists in the Ethiopian system, the practice of courts, 
particularly that of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench, is an important 
source of provisional remedy. The Ministry of Justice, as per the extensive 
powers given to it under the Criminal Justice Administration Policy, can also 
play a big role in clarifying this area of the law through the issuance of 
indicative practical guidelines.
The notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is found not only in the 
writings of scholars, but it is also expressed in public statements, various public 
prosecutor documents and some court judgments. For example, Prime Minister 
Hailemariam Desalegn, addressing the House of People’s Representatives, 
stated that the Ethiopian criminal justice system made sure that individuals were 
convicted only when their crime has been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Public prosecutors, in passing a decision for the discontinuity of 
investigation, usually state that the evidence presented does not suffice to 
warrant the conviction of the defendant establishing guilt ‘beyond sufficient 
doubt’ The practical aspects of these expressions and sincere allegiance to the 
pledges that are made toward the protection of individual rights indeed require 
steps to make sure that the standard of proof is set high in criminal cases and 
that such standard is properly understood and applied by courts. _______■
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